Abstract: Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limarí Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability, were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for market redesign.
Introduction
In a thoughtful and influential introduction to experimental economics, Al Roth distinguishes among experiments according to the conversation they belong to and the audience they are intended to persuade (Roth 1995) . Experiments that "Speak to Theorists" test a developed formal model while those "Searching for Facts" investigate variables for which existing theory has little to say. Experiments that "Whisper in the Ears of Princes" enhance the dialogue between researchers and policymakers, for example, to shed light on the impact of a change in market organization. We conduct a field experiment that makes contributions to the first and third of Roth's categories by studying farmers' willingness-to-pay for water in the Limarí Valley of Chile. The experiments speak to theorists by providing fresh evidence on the properties of the right-to-choose -or bidder's choice -auction, which was shown to raise more revenue than bilateral bargaining in a seminal field study (Ashenfelter and Genosove 1992) . Secondarily, the experiments whisper to princes by providing fresh insights on price discovery, and help identify opportunities to improve the performance of the market for water in Chile.
To achieve our primary objective the protocol introduces within-subject variation in the "type" of water for sale, which varies by reservoir source and time of delivery, and betweensubject variation in the auction institutions, which use sequential and right-to-choose allocation rules. In the sequential auction treatment (SEQ), goods are sold in an exogenously determined order. For the right-to-choose (RTC) institution, the 'good' for sale is the right to choose an item from the heterogeneous group of goods that remain in a particular auction phase. The SEQ auction serves as a control for the RTC institution in our study, as it has in previous experimental and theoretical work. Burguet (2007) has shown that when risk-averse bidders differ in their preference orderings for the goods, the right to choose auction will lead to higher bids and revenues. However, laboratory studies using induced values provide mixed evidence on the importance of risk aversion. Goeree, Plott and Wooders (2004) report results that support Burguet's model. They find that the RTC raises more revenue than the SEQ benchmark and that an estimate of a common constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter yields both a plausible value and a better fit to their data than a risk-neutral model. Eliaz, Offerman, and Schotter (2008) introduce an RTC variant that should raise less revenue than SEQ but find that it also generates more revenue. As a result, they argue that risk attitudes cannot entirely explain their data.
Our study extends the previous research in several important ways. First, we bridge a gap between the laboratory evidence just cited and uncontrolled field data since subjects bid for a commodity -water for agricultural use -that is important to them outside the experimental setting. In the lexicon of Harrison and List (2004) , our study is a framed field experiment. 3 The benefit of the framed field experiment is that the data generating process is tied to the field setting of interest, but the use of controlled variation and randomization, as in laboratory studies, supports causal inference (List 2006 ).
Second, we elicit individual risk attitudes independently of bidding behavior using a multiple price list (MPL) protocol based on the design of Holt and Laury (2002) . The exogenous elicitation of risk attitudes for each individual creates a closer link to the theoretical literature than in the previous laboratory studies. Evidence in many populations of heterogeneity of risk attitudes suggests that the elicitation should be important empirically . We also elicit time preferences using an MPL protocol in order to control for the temporal differences in water types. Finally, we survey respondents to capture additional demographic and market experience variables that may influence bidding behavior.
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To implement the framed field experiment we build on an important strand of experimental research that exports incentive-compatible mechanisms -studied in the lab with induced values -into field settings to elicit and study homegrown values. Applications have been prominent in studies of willingness-to-pay for food characteristics, such as genetic modification, traceability, or organic production (examples include Dickinson and Bailey 2002 , Lusk et al. 2001 , Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2004 . A virtue of these studies is the use of salient incentives, thereby addressing concerns about hypothetical bias in the stated preference literature. 5 Mechanisms that have been used to elicit homegrown values include individual choice designs and auctions of various types, in both research and natural settings such as retail outlets (Rutstrom 1998, Harrison, Harstad, and Rustrom 2004) . In our study we implement a 3 A framed field experiment has field context "in either the commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can use" (Harrison and List 2004) . 4 Alevy and Price (2009), to our knowledge, are the only previous researchers to study the RTC auction in the field. They find no evidence that the RTC results in increased bids or revenues relative to the SEQ benchmark. The difference between their results and ours are a subject for future research. 5 However, progress has been made with protocols that introduce salience and incentive compatibility into stated preference settings (see e.g. Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt 2008) .
sealed-bid, second-price auction; choosing the former due to concerns about bidder privacy, and the latter to provide a clean counterfactual to address the theoretical question, since with the second price rule, risk attitudes play no role in the SEQ treatment.
The elicitation of risk and time preferences along with bids for water allows us to cleanly test hypotheses on the performance of the RTC institution. Our results yield strong evidence in support of the extant theory on the importance of risk aversion. In addition to this primary result, the experimental approach makes several contributions. First, although market institutions for water in the Limarí Valley have been in use -and been studied -for many years, our understanding of price discovery and price dispersion remains tentative. The elicitation of homegrown values yields fresh information, since we observe underlying reservation values for all bidders, including those who are extramarginal traders in the marketplace. Further, by manipulating the characteristics of the goods our protocol allows us to observe heterogeneity in preferences across types, providing insight into the extent to which thin markets for water might be thickened through alternative trading instruments and institutions. The experiments thus contribute to a longer-term project that investigates the reorganization of the market for water, including the possible implementation of an electronic marketplace, and thus fit comfortably in Roth's "whispering" category.
Water Law and the Study Area
According to the Chilean Water Code, approved in 1981 and modified in 2005, water rights are private, separable from land holdings, and tradable. Trade can occur through a variety of instruments that include the permanent transfer of rights, long-term leases, and spot market transactions for water used in the current growing season. Our field experiments focus on the spot market since these are the transactions observed most frequently both in current and historical data in the area under study (Cristi, et al. 2002) .
The study area is in an irrigated zone in the Limarí River Basin in Chile`s Coquimbo Region (region IV) which is 472 kilometers north of the capital of Santiago. The hydrologic system is primarily niveous, fed from the snow-covered Andes Mountains, with an average annual precipitation of only 140 mm. Of the 60,000 irrigated hectares in the zone 40,000 hectares receive water from three interconnected dams that form what is known as the Paloma System.
Agricultural production in the Paloma System is diverse, with land planted in traditional crops such as maize, beans, and potatoes, horticultural crops (artichokes, peppers and tomatoes), grains, pasture as well as valuable perennial crops such as avocados, export grapes and grapes used for pisco, a local liquor. The perennial crops are grown mainly in the area below the dams.
The farmer base is also diverse and consists of orchard owners, medium-sized farms, and a few large multinational fruit exporters.
We study water users who rely on the Paloma System which has a storage capacity of one billion cubic meters and a sophisticated infrastructure that connects the different irrigation districts. Distribution of water among users is managed by the Water User Associations (WUAs) whose members are farmers from a specific river, canal or geographical area. While the WUAs have legal status related to administration, they do not own water rights, which remain the property of the association's members. Water is distributed at the opening of the agricultural season in April, when each WUA receives a proportion of the water stored in the dams based on historical shares. Members receive allotments from their WUA according to the number of water rights they hold. Thus the amount of water contained in a right can vary from year to year. In September, after the winter rainy season has concluded, it is possible that the amount of water associated with a right will be increased for all rights holders.
Owners of rights can freely transact to reallocate the initial allocation and an active spot market has been facilitated by the flexible infrastructure and the efficient administration of the WUAs. The spot market is active not only during drought periods, but also in seasons with "normal" water availability. In normal seasons, demand arises from structural motives associated with existing production technologies and plans. Farmers unable to satisfy their water requirements with their stock of water rights are potential buyers, while farmers that have more water rights than they need for their own production are potential sellers.
Farmers that do not participate in the market in normal years may enter the market in drought years. These farmers have higher marginal returns and demand water to stabilize output. by shifting to less water intensive crops (Zegarra, 2002) .
The size of the spot market depends, in part, on the amount of water distributed from the dams. The distribution decision is made by the Administration of the Paloma System which is required to ensure the availability of water for three years (including the current season). When the dams are full they contain one billion cubic meters and the annual distribution is 362 million cubic meters. 7 In dry years as little as 115 million cubic meters has been distributed. The spot market has varied in size from 3.5% to 9.1% of the allocated supply in recent seasons, somewhat less than 12% estimated for the period 1995-2000 (Cristi et al. 2002) .
Trade in the spot market occurs through two institutions. The primary market functions through the offices of the WUAs, where farmers can indicate trading interest by declaring offers to buy or sell. In drought years this system is supplemented by market activity in the Ovalle town square. In both cases, most negotiations are bilateral. There are also some water brokers, but they act largely as intermediaries in the water rights market and tend not to be active in the spot market (Palma, 2009 ).
All water transactions must be reported to the appropriate WUA, who record the amount of water exchanged and make it available to the buyer. There is no reporting requirement for prices, nor any formal mechanism for disseminating price information, which largely remains private information. Moreover, the quantities exchanged are not publicized by the WUAs. Thus, although the spot market can be active there is little public information about price and quantity.
These institutional arrangements highlight the need for analytical tools to better understand spot market performance.
Using survey data from farmers Zegarra (2002) was able to generate a time series of spot market prices for the period 1994 to 1997. He reports that water prices in the spot market are highly variable, especially in dry years. Zegarra (2002) suggests that the variance is due to transaction costs because he assumes that water is highly homogeneous resource for which one would not expect significant differences in quality or other attributes affecting prices.
Zegarra (2002) focuses on the operation of the spot market in the Limarí Valley in the face of an extremely negative shock. He found that the spot market for water solves differences in the marginal return of water among farmers, promoting the allocation of water from low value annual crops to high value permanent crops. Nevertheless, he also shows that in the context of severe drought, the water market starts to be less effective in allocating the resource, with greater water price dispersion, due to inflexibility caused by a more concentrated farming activity on permanent crops.
In addition to Zeggara's (2002) terms of water exchanged. He also describes farmers` motives to participate in the markets for water. Cristi (2007) analyzes the factors that explain market transactions of water rights when there is also a spot market for water volumes, and shows that risk heterogeneity among farmers is critical to explaining those transactions.
Theory and Evidence on the Right-to-Choose Auction
The evidence from previous research that outcomes in the water market depend on the risk attitudes of participants helps shape our experimental design (Cristi 2007) . In this section we explore how risk attitudes are expected to affect bidding behavior in the auction institutions we implement in the field. In the SEQ treatment, with heterogeneous goods and a second-price rule, bidding one's value for each good is a dominant strategy. In the RTC setting, bidding true value is the dominant strategy only in the final phase of the auction, and bids should be biased upwards in earlier phases if bidders are risk-averse.
The impact of risk aversion in the RTC setting can be demonstrated with a two-bidder, twogood model, originally developed by Burguet (1999) . In this model, each bidder has unit demand for one of the two goods and is equally likely to prefer either good. As a result there is a fifty percent chance that both bidders will prefer the same good and a fifty percent chance that they will prefer different goods. Payoff for the (dis)preferred good is 1(0). The right to choose is offered in a sequence of two auction phases, and the bidder that wins the right in phase one is inactive in phase two. In the second phase of the RTC a bidder that remains active has a fifty percent chance of receiving their preferred good. Expected utility in phase 2, therefore, is . Given their phase 2 expectations, backwards induction implies bidders will not pay more than R in the first phase where
Normalizing 1 1 and 0 0 yields 1 , and with · concave, .
Thus, when bidders are risk-averse, the RTC institution raises more revenue than the SEQ alternative in which expected revenues are equal to (Burguet 1999 (Burguet , 2007 . Intuitively, the possibility that one's preferred good will be chosen early makes the value of the later auctions less certain. Risk-averse buyers are therefore willing to pay a premium to secure their favored good in an early round. As a consequence, the RTC auction creates competition across goods that individually may have relatively thin markets. In the context of the water market study, increased revenues in the RTC auction imply that the water "types" are in fact perceived as distinct goods, and that attempts to aggregate goods into a thicker market would be unsuccessful.
The bulk of the evidence on the performance of the RTC relative to the SEQ comes from laboratory experiments using induced values. Goeree, Plott, and Wooders (2004) conduct experiments with two goods and 4 bidders in each auction and find higher revenues in the RTC than in the SEQ. They estimate a model that assumes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and find that it yields a significantly better fit to the data than a risk-neutral model. Eliaz, Offerman, and Schotter (2008) also find overbidding in the RTC, however, in a novel treatment in which information about which good is chosen is not revealed, behavior inconsistent with risk aversion is observed. Their "no information right-to-choose" (NIRTC) treatment creates a lottery in which risk-averse bidders should bid less than the SEQ benchmark after the first auction phase. Since the NIRTC outperforms the SEQ in their study, the authors seek an alternative to risk aversion to explain their data. They argue that their results are better understood by assuming that bidders overestimate the extent of competition for their preferred good, an argument consistent with reports from professional auctioneers. In both of the published studies, the empirical analysis imposes a common risk parameter across the pool of bidders, an assumption inconsistent with the experimental evidence (see e.g. Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2007) . One contribution of the current study is that it addresses the heterogeneity of risk preferences by eliciting individual attitudes to risk that can be used as control variables in econometric estimates of bid functions.
To our knowledge, only one other experimental study of the RTC institution has been conducted in a field setting. Alevy and Price (2009) compared RTC and SEQ institutions, auctioning consumer goods that included iPods, hiking equipment, and fine wines. Contrary to the laboratory results, aggregate bids and revenues did not differ across the two auction institutions in their study. Summarizing across experimental studies, there does not appear to be a strong consensus on the impact of risk aversion on bidding behavior. However, we believe that the use of risk and time preference elicitations in the current study will shed fresh light on the question. .
Subject Pool and Experimental Design
The experimental auctions for water were conducted with farm owners in the Limarí Valley in the city of Ovalle on August 22 nd 2008. Ovalle is the largest city in the valley, centrally located and frequently visited by our subject population due to the input and output markets, and the financial services that are available in the city. Forty-nine farmers attended the session and bids were received from forty-one. To accomplish the objective of eliciting real WTP for water from the farmers, the research team purchased water in advance from two water user associations and then offered the water for sale in the auctions. The session took approximately 4 hours and included a lunch served to the participants.
The RTC and SEQ institutions were studied with a between-subjects design. Before salient bids for water were requested, subjects were split into two groups and each was introduced to the specific auction institution they would be using. Training auctions were conducted in which items that included pens, calculators and calendars were sold in distinct phases using procedures identical to those in the water auctions. All auctions were "hand-run" with written bids collected in each auction phase. The person submitting the highest bid was awarded either the specific good for sale (SEQ), or the right-to-choose their preferred good from among those remaining (RTC), and was required to pay the second highest submitted bid.
In each auction treatment four goods were sold in four separate bidding phases. In each phase the good consisted of 1,000 cubic meters of water and the four alternatives varied by source and by the timing of the acquisition. The goods included (i) 1,000 cubic meters from the Cogoti reservoir available the business day following the auction, (ii) 1,000 cubic meters from the Cogoti reservoir available 30 calendar days after the auction, (iii) 1,000 cubic meters from the Camarico reservoir available the business day following the auction, and (iv) 1,000 cubic meters from the Camarico reservoir available 30 calendar days after the auction (see also Table   1 ). In addition to the auctions, the session included auxiliary protocols to elicit risk and time preferences for each subject. A short survey to gather information on demographic attributes and on market experience was also conducted. Table 2 provides an overview of the sequencing of tasks in the experimental session.
The elicitation of risk and time preferences made use of the multiple price list (MPL) methodology (Andersen et al. 2008 ; see also instructions in appendix). Time preferences were elicited over three different periods, (i) 0-30 days, (ii) 30-60 days and (iii) 0-60 days for cash payments that ranged from 5400 to 7600 Chilean Pesos and using 10 questions in each series.
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One of the thirty questions selected at random for each subject, and they were paid according to the preferences expressed in the selected question. Those receiving payments on day zero were paid in cash at the end of the experimental session. For those receiving payments thirty or sixty days in the future, arrangements were made for payments to be available at the offices of the appropriate WUAs. The results from time preference elicitation (ii) are used as a control variable in the regression analysis, below. Series (ii) is used since the payment methodologythrough the WUAs -is constant for both dates in the elicitation. Thus, the time preferences are not confounded by differences in transaction costs associated with the different methods used to distribute the funds.
Risk preferences were elicited from two MPL sequences, each containing ten questions. In one, the lottery outcomes consisted of cash payments and in the other the outcomes were in water volumes. The lottery payoffs over water volumes were parameterized to be similar in expected value to the cash payoffs using the prices at which the research team purchased the water on the day prior to the research session. 10 The order of presentation of the two lists was counterbalanced across the subject pool. The values used in the risk and time elicitations are in Table 3 panels A and B.
Experimental results Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the control variables from the auxiliary protocols that elicit individual bidder's risk and time preferences. Using nonparametric tests we fail to reject the null hypotheses that central tendencies and the shape of the distributions are the same across the RTC and SEQ treatments.
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We also fail to reject the null hypothesis of risk neutrality for the population as a whole, based on a test of means. However, we do observe significant heterogeneity across individuals. Figure 1 presents the distribution of risk preferences
and Figure 2 the distribution of time preferences, which is bimodal. Table 6 presents Tobit estimates for two models of bidding behavior. Model 1 includes an indicator variable for the auction institution, RTC, which is 1 (0) for the RTC (SEQ) institution, and for each good in order of bidder preference (Prefx, where 1,2,3,4 indicates the preference ranking), and interactions of the auction institution and the Prefx variables. The use of the preference ranking as an explanatory variable, rather than the specific good, is driven by the theoretical model which assumes heterogeneity of preferences and therefore that bids for different goods in the same phase of the RTC drive the differences across institutions. This heterogeneity is in fact observed in the auction data.
Model 2 adds several explanatory variables to the Model 1 specification. The categorical variable for risk attitude, risk, ranges from 0 to 10 and is increasing with risk aversion. The value represents the number of times the safe lottery (Lottery A) is chosen in the ten question risk elicitation protocol. Time preference (time) is defined similarly, with the value representing the number of times the 'early' (Choice A) is chosen. We also include an indicator for market experience, which takes the value of 1 (0) if the subject has (has not) ever participated in the spot market for water as a buyer. The variable risk is also interacted with the RTC indicator variable, in Model 2, since theory suggests risk attitude has different effects in the two institutions. We also examine the impacts of time both directly on bidding behavior, and interacted with an indicator variable (now) that takes on the values of 1 (0) for goods available today (in 30 days).
Model 1 yields insights similar to those gleaned from the tabulated data in Table 5 ; it provides evidence that bids are dramatically higher in the RTC institution, with the RTC coefficient equal to 48.28 (p < 0.0001). 12 In addition, we find that subjects had similar values for their two most preferred goods. Evidence for this finding arises from the coefficient for Pref2 which, both on its own and when interacted with RTC is found to be not significantly different from zero, and thus bids do not differ significantly from the omitted category of the most preferred good. Bids decline substantially for the less preferred goods (Pref3 and Pref4) in both auction institutions, reinforcing the finding of heterogeneity in preferences.
Model 2 sheds light on the underlying factors associated with the observed outcomes and on the theoretical propositions outlined in section 3. We find that the risk variable does not have a direct effect in our model as the coefficient (-1.41) is not statistically significant (p = 0.65).
However, when interacted with the RTC institution, there is a large and statistically significant effect. The coefficient of RTC x risk is 8.80 (p = 0.02). Thus for the median level of risk aversion in the sample, (median risk = 5) we find bids more than 40 pesos per cubic meter higher in the RTC treatment. Time preferences also have significant effect on bids with a marginal increase in time leading to a fall in bids by 2.97 pesos per cubic meter (p = 0.02). This effect is moderated for the subset of goods available for immediate purchase, with the coefficient on the interaction of now x time equal to 0.82 (p = 0.06) and the net effect still negative as determined by a Wald test in which the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected (p = 0.09). Thus, those with higher discount rates have lower willingness-to-pay for goods regardless of the date of availability, with the effect moderated, but not eliminated, for goods available immediately. Finally, we note that those with experience as buyers in the spot market bid significantly more for water than their inexperienced colleagues (coefficient on experience = 17.17, p = 0.07).
The key substantive finding from Model 2 is that, after adding the control variables, the RTC indicator is substantially smaller (5.03) and no longer statistically significant (p = 0.79).
Thus the differences in bidding behavior between the two auction institutions are explained by the controls we introduce in the model. Risk attitudes play the largest role in explaining the results and thus our results provide additional support for Burguet's theory (2007) . Market experience also plays an important role. However, caution is required in interpreting the effect, since experience serves as proxy for variables associated with farm production practices that are correlated with higher values for water. Thus, while we might expect those who have been in the market to be willing to pay more for water relative to those who have not, the magnitude of the premium is somewhat surprising. The average bid of the experienced buyers reflects a price 68% higher than the price paid by the research team the previous day. The lack of censoring at market price suggests that under the existing institution of bilateral negotiation, information on prices is not widely dispersed, even among those who have participated in the market in the past.
Thus it seems likely that an alternative institution, in which prices are publicly announced, could play an important role in price discovery.
Conclusion
The functioning of the spot market for water volumes in the Paloma System was studied using field experimental techniques. Willingness-to-pay for water of distinct types was elicited from farmers in both sequential and right-to-choose auction institutions. We find strong evidence in this setting that risk attitudes explain a substantial portion of the difference between the two auction institutions, lending support to the theory of Burguet (2007) . Our results thus extend a literature that has relied primarily on induced values, by working with field context and homegrown values. We also relax the assumption of risk preference homogeneity, and directly elicit heterogeneous risk attitudes. The results on risk are consistent with the results of Cristi (2007) who found that heterogeneity of risk preferences were important in motivating participation in the spot market. Our results contrast with the earlier field study of Alevy and Price (2009) and the cause of these differences is an area for further research.
Our findings have implications for policy proposals aimed at improving market functioning in the Limarí Valley. The competition across goods engendered by the right-tochoose auction clearly indicates that specific characteristics are important to buyers and access to contracts with temporal and spatial variability is likely to improve the functioning of the market. The finding that participants with market experience were willing to pay a substantial premium over current market prices deserves additional study. In combination with the volatile prices observed in previous empirical studies, it suggests that there may be opportunities to increase market efficiency through formalizing and modernizing exchange mechanisms, and publicizing market prices. In all cases the volume of water is 1,000 cubic meters. 2, 1400 .8, 900 .2, 2500 .8, 250 3 .3, 1400 .7, 900 .3, 2500 .7, 250 4 .4, 1400 .6, 900 .4, 2500 .6, 250 5 .5, 1400 .5, 900 .5, 2500 .5, 250 6 .6, 1400 .4, 900 .6, 2500 .4, 250 7 .7, 1400 .3, 900 .7, 2500 .3, 250 8 .8, 1400 .2, 900 .8, 2500 .2, 250 9 .9, 1400 .1, 900 .9, 2500 .1, 250 10 1.0, 1400 0.0, 900 1.0, 2500 0.0, 250 Each cell presents the probability and the payoff for a component of a lottery. Payoff amounts are in cubic meters of water. The risk variable is a count of the number of choices of Lottery A. 1  5400  5490  2  5400  5580  3  5400  5670  4  5400  5760  5  5400  5850  6  5400  5940  7  5400  6030  8  5400  6120  9  5400  6210  10 5400 6300 Payment amounts are in Chilean Pesos. The exchange rate for U.S. dollars was 520 pesos per U.S. dollar at the time of the experimental session. The time variable is a count of the number A choices. Cell values are the mean and standard deviation of auction bids by order of bidder's preference. Record your subject number on your decision sheet. Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each decision is a paired choice between OPTION A and OPTION B. You will make ten choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them will be used in the end to determine your earnings. Before you start making your ten choices, please let me explain how these choices will affect your earnings for this part of the experiment.
We will use part of a deck of cards to determine payoffs; cards 2-10 and the Ace will represent "1". After you have made all of your choices, we will randomly select a card twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. (After the first card is selected, it will be put back in the pile, the deck will be reshuffled, and the second card will be drawn). Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. OPTION A pays $2.800 if the Ace is selected, and it pays $2.200 if the card selected is 2-10. OPTION B yields $5.000 if the Ace is selected, and it pays $500 if the card selected is 2-10. The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the cards will not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $2.800 or $5.000.
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose between OPTION A and OPTION B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. When you are finished with Part II of the experiment, we will come to your desk and pick a card to determine which of the ten decisions will be used. Then we will put the card back in the deck, shuffle, and select a card again to determine your money earnings for the OPTION you chose for that decision. Earnings for this choice will be added to your previous earnings, and you will be paid all earnings in cash when we finish.
So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will have to write a decision, A or B in each of these boxes, and then the card selection will determine which one is going to count. We will look at the decision that you made for the choice that counts, and circle it, before selecting a card again to determine your earnings for this part. Then you will write your earnings in the blank at the bottom of the page. Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not talk with anyone else while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question. 
ID: X______________

Experimental Instructions RTC Auction
Welcome. Today you have the opportunity to bid in an auction where we will be selling the goods described below If you have a question at any time during the session, please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your seat and answer it in private.
Available goods Good 1: 1.000 cubic meters of water from Camario, today Good 1: 1.000 cubic meters of water from Camario, in a month Good 1: 1.000 cubic meters of water from Cogotí, today Good 1: 1.000 cubic meters of water from Cagotí, in a month
Explanation of the auction
The auction consists of four phases. In every phase, instead of selling a specific good, we will sell the right-to-choose one of the goods.
The highest bidder in every phase wins and chooses their preferred good from among those that remain.
At the end of the first three phases every buyer will be informed about the goods that have been selected and what remain available.
In the final phase (4), all the buyers offer a price for the only good that remains.
The auction price
In every phase you should bid a price that corresponds to the maximum that you are willing to pay for acquiring the right to choose. The offered prices can be of any total in intervals of 10 pesos. For example: 10, 20, 100, 110. In addition to the price you must indicate the good that you want to choose if you win.
Once each of the buyers has entered his price, all prices will be ordered from largest to smallest to determine which buyer obtains the right to choose.
Important: the price that the winner of every phase pays is not the price that he bid, but the value of the second highest bid in that phase. . . If you do not win the right to choose, you do not have to pay anything.
If there is a tie for the highest bid, the winner will be chosen by means of a coin flip. In this case the winner will pay a price equal to his bid, since it is also the second highest price.
Example: suppose that the following goods are offered for sale (i) A bicycle (ii) A computer (iii) A chair
The results of the first phase are in the following table.
